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Recent Developments 
State v. Fisher 
County Administrative Judge Is Not Required to Make Findings or Articulate 
Reasons Demonstrating that Postponement Was Warranted 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
Maryland Rule 4-271 and Art. 27, § 
591 do not require an administrative 
judge to articulate a good cause 
reason for postponing a trial date 
beyond the 180-day limitations 
period. State v. Fisher, 353 Md. 
297, 726 A.2d 231 (1999). The 
court further held that the defendant 
has the burden of demonstrating the 
existence of a speedy trial violation 
based on either a clear abuse of 
discretion standard or a lack of good 
cause as a matter of law. In so 
holding, the court afforded state 
administrative judges wide discretion 
when postponing a trial date past the 
180-day limit. 
James Quinn Fisher ("Fisher") 
was charged with various drug 
offenses, including possession of crack 
cocaine with the intent to distribute. 
Id at 299, 726 A.2d at 232. On July 
10, 1997, Fisher's attorney entered 
his appearance, triggering the 180-day 
period in which the case would have 
to be tried under Rule 4-271 and Art. 
27, § 591. Id. The case was 
scheduled for a bench trial on 
December 2, 1997,butbecausethe 
defendant requested a jury trial on or 
about that day, the case was 
postponed 42 days beyond the 180 
day limit. Id. at 300, 726 A.2d at 
232. 
On February 17,1998, when 
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the matter was again called for trial, 
the defendant moved to dismiss the 
case based on a speedy trial violation 
under § 591 and Rule 4-271. Id· The 
trial judge denied the motion, stating 
that the administrative judge had the 
authority to postpone the case and 
had done so upon good cause. Id at 
301,726A.2dat233. Subsequently, 
the defendant pled not guilty, and was 
tried on an agreed statement of facts. 
Id. Fisher was convicted on all 
charges in the Circuit Court for 
Washington County and was 
sentenced to nine years in prison. Id 
The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland reversed, holding that 
Rule 4-271 and § 591 were violated 
because Fisher was not tried within 
the prescribed time limit and the 
administrative judge neglected to 
articulate a good cause finding. Id. 
The court of appeals granted the 
State's petition for certiorari and 
reversed. Id at 303, 726 A.2d at 
234. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland relied on prior case law to 
support its conclusion that the court 
of special appeals's holding was 
inconsistent with previous Maryland 
decisions regarding the defendant's 
right to a speedy trial. Id The court 
first visited Goins v. State, 293 Md. 
97,442 A.2d 550 (1982), where the 
defendant was not tried within the 
180-day limit due to the extensive 
examination period resulting from a 
"not criminally responsible" plea. Id 
at 303, 726 A.2d at 234. In Goins, 
the court of appeals held that Rule 
4-271 and § 591 were satisfied 
anytime an order by the administrative 
judge effectively postponed a trial, so 
long as it was done in good cause. 
Id at 305, 726 A.2d at 235 (citing 
Goins, 293 Md. at 111-112, 442 
A.2d at 557-558). 
The court also analyzed State 
v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422,470 A.2d 
1269 (1984), in which the court of 
appeals re-affirmed Goins by 
holding that an administrative judge's 
decision to postpone a trial is a 
"discretionary matter, rarely subject 
to reversal upon review." Id. at 306, 
726 A.2d at 235 (citing Frazier, 298 
Md. at 451,470 A.2d at 1284). In 
Frazier, the court discussed the 
standard for finding an absence of 
good cause for a postponement 
beyond the 180 day limit. Id. (citing 
Frazier, 298 Md. at 454,470 A.2d 
at 1286). The court held that a judge 
should not find an absence of good 
cause unless "the defendant meets 
the burden of demonstrating either a 
clear abuse of discretion or a lack of 
good cause as a matter oflaw." Id. 
Based on the rationale given in 
Goins and Frazier, the court in the 
instant case held that the burden is 
not on the administrative judge to 
explain the reasons amounting to 
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good cause, but instead on the 
defendant to demonstrate either a lack 
of good cause as a matter oflaw, or a 
clear abuse of discretion by the trial 
judge. Id. at 307, 726 A.2d at 236. 
Here, the court held that Fisher failed 
to meet this burden Id. at 308, 726 
A.2d at 236. 
Fisher also argued that the length 
of delay from the original 180-day 
mark to the actual trial date was an 
"inordinate" delay, and therefore 
violated Article 27, § 591 and Rule 
4-271. Id. at 309, 726 A.2d at 237. 
The court of appeals again looked to 
Frazier for guidance in determining 
which delays are considered 
"inordinate." In Frazier, the court 
held that a delay of 86 days beyond 
the 180-day mark was not a violation 
of§591 or Rule 4-271 because there 
was no clear abuse of discretion 
shown on the part of the administrative 
judge. Id. at 310, 726 A.2d at 237 
(citing Frazier, 298 Md. at 462, 470 
A.2d at 1290). The Frazier court 
explained its refusal to find a clear 
abuse of discretion by stating that an 
administrative judge is in a much better 
position than either a trial or appellate 
judge to determine whether there is 
good cause to re-schedule a trial, 
because he or she is more aware of 
the number of cases on the criminal 
docket. Id. at 309-10, 726 A.2d at 
237. Thus, the Fisher court 
concluded that because extending the 
180-day limit by 86 days did not 
constitute an "inordinate" delay, a 
delay of 42 days would not violate 
Rule 4-271 or § 591 either. Id. at 
311, 726 A.2d at 238. As such, the 
administrative judge neither failed to 
show good cause, nor abused his or 
her discretion in postponing Fisher's 
trial. 
With its holding, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland placed the 
burden of proving a speedy trial 
violation on the defendant. Once 
thought of as a Constitutional 
protection for the defendant, the court 
of appeals narrowed the defendant's 
right to speedy justice by significantly 
broadening an administrative judge's 
discretion. While trial delay is often 
beneficial to the defense, this decision 
reduces the likelihood that Maryland 
defendants will ever incorporate the 
speedy trial rule into their trial strategy. 
Moreover, the court of appeals's 
interpretation of the speedy trial rule 
gives Maryland prosecutors more 
confidence when requesting a strategic 
postponement, even if that date falls 
beyond the 180-day limit. 
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